My Definition of God

The word ‘god’ means very different things to different people, even within the same society, before we even consider the vastly different conceptions of god of all of the different cultures and religions all around the world, and throughout history. However, there certainly are some common elements to such definitions such as exceptional power and knowledge, immortality or eternalness. But apart from these few properties, the name 'god' has been applied to an enormously varied range of intentional objects, from a human-like deity to an abstract pseudo-being.

Any atheist who wishes to either disprove the existence of god, or at least show why their existence is improbable, needs to give an explicit definition of god. What is it exactly that the atheist is rejecting? Does this being having any relation whatsoever to what theists and deists believe? For example, I could easily claim to disprove the existence of god, and then proceed to do so, if my definition of god were something like this: "a round square". This definition is explicitly contradictory and so no such round square could exist in reality. But this "being" bears no resemblance whatsoever to the being worshipped by conventional religions, other than the name which is used to refer to them (i.e. 'god').

When the theist gives a definition of god they invariably define god as specifically the being they believe in and not all possible gods. Take for example this definition given by Richard Swinburne, Nolloth Professor of  the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, Oxford:

“I take the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equivalent to ‘there exists necessarily a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things’ ”

(The Existence of God, pp. 7)

There is no reason why all possible gods need to have these specific powers and attributes. Surely a being with a finite amount of power rather than omnipotence (that is, the ability to do anything which is logically possible) would still qualify as a god. So when Swinburne says that he is giving a definition of god he is rather defining the specific god which he believes exist. This happens to be the god of the Ontological argument, first proposed by St. Anselm (1033-1109) of Canterbury:

“If therefore that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, then this thing than which nothing greater can be conceived is something than which a greater can be conceived. And this is clearly impossible. Therefore, there can be no doubt at all that something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in both the understanding and in reality.”

(Saint Anselm, Proslogion)

Like Professor Swinburne, many atheists also define god as the most perfect being possible. But of course they would deny (as I would) that (necessary) existence is a Great Making property. And so god does not exist necessarily. They would cite the incompatible-properties arguments as proof of god's non-existence (I shall be writing about these arguments in the coming weeks so don't worry if you don't know what they are). However, the atheist who defines god in such a limited way is doing so without justification. As I wrote earlier, god could easily be different than what the Ontological argument states god is like.

Having considered all of the various definitions of god given by both believers and non-believers throughout history, I have come to see the following as the most parsimonious way of delineating such a complicated affair as this. The key feature, I believe, which separates god from all other types of beings is eternality. These gods can then be shoe-horned into one of two categories according to whether they are immaterial, or have a material body:

Class i: An eternal being who exists immaterially. What theologians would call a 'simple' being, made up of no physical parts.

Class ii: The gods of most ancient cultures. Eternal beings who have a human-like body, usually with only limited powers.

Since most believers today consider god to be an immaterial being, most of what I say in my blog posts will only apply to class i gods. However, this does not mean that it isn't important to acknowledge the possibility that god has a material body.

References:

Swinburne, Richard. (2004). The Existence of God, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.